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JUDICIAL LEGISLATION IN AIRPORT
LITIGATION -

A BLESSING OR DANGER?

Gerald L. Hallworth*
In general, law adapts to changing conditions little by little. The evolution
of the law is a long, hard process, and one that requires the mellowing of time.
"This work of modification is gradual. It goes on inch by inch. Its effects must
be measured by decades and even centuries." 1
Occasionally, however, there comes a great technological change or advance
that requires a rapid re-orientation of the law - a change so sweeping that the
older rules and procedures cannot be allowed to have their modification measured in terms of many decades, yet alone in centuries. The change cannot be
allowed to move with the "....

power and pressure of the moving glacier." 2

Rather it is more like the sudden burst of energy that occasions a snow slide.
Such an instance involves the growth of the "flying contraption," from the original one hundred twenty feet and twelve seconds at Kitty Hawk,' to the needlenosed craft that flirts with the boundaries of outer space. This great technological
advance called for a re-shaping of the law. Involved was a fundamental principle of the Anglo-American heritage: the right to have, use, and enjoy property.
A right that the Constitution recognized could be abridged, but only if "just
compensation" was to be forthcoming.' Those owning and using property around
and near the developing air terminals were assaulted in their enjoyment and
use. An assault that began with a noise like that of a washing machine; a noise
that was to develop into the full-throated roar of mighty, gasoline-powered
engines; a roar that was to climax in a blazing crescendo of the jet - a
window-shattering and -house-withering noise from the new monsters of the sky.
From the earliest attempts at Kitty Hawk in 1903 to the beginnings of the thunder over the Thomas Griggs' property was but fifty short years;' but five decades
that saw the law making an adaptation to a radically new position. From this
new position, a continued adaption was made. This adaption led to the final
conclusion that airplane noise is "destructive" of property. The culmination
was a final holding that noise is a taking, thus meeting the latest advance from
the gasoline to the kerosene engine. From the deep-throated roar of the propeller
to' the swoosh and whine of the jet, this is the story that is revealed in Griggs v.
Allegheny County.'
In 1946, Thomas P. Griggs bought 19.2 acres of pleasant, rolling land, far
away from the hustle and bustle of the metropolis of Pittsburgh' In 1952,
*
Department of Govt., Univ. of Texas, Austin, Texas. B.A., Univ. of Washington, 1961;
M.A., Ariz. State Univ., 1963; Joining Faculty Dept. of Govt., No. Tex. State Univ., Sept. 1964.

1

C~ADozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25

2

Ibid.

(1921).

3 PAYNE, AIR DATES 10 (1957).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 The Wright Brothers made their first flight on December 7, 1903. PAYNE, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 10. The Greater Pittsburgh Airport opened June 1, 1952. Gardner v. Alle-

gheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491, 493 (1955).
6 369 U.S.84 (1962).
7 Lambert & Joost, Aviation Law: Comments On Recent Aviation Cases, 29 NACCA LJ.
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the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, owned and operated by Allegheny County,
opened for business.' As the jet-age moved forward, Griggs could watch from
his bed as huge jet-liners left the end of the runway, three thousand feet distant,
appeared to fly directly at the bedroom window, then, with the distinctive
screech of the jet engine, rose and passed overhead with an all but deafening
sound.' Griggs and others brought action on grounds of nuisance, and they
sought injunctive relief."0 The Viewers 1 report in the first case held that: "The
power to appropriate 'land' therefore, carried with it the power to appropriate
an easement over land and the laying out of that easement by a plan constituted an act of dominion or condemnation by the County of Allegheny."' 2
In this first case, the Viewers report was not followed and injunctive relief
was denied to the nine property owners. 3 Griggs then pressed on against Allegheny County on the grounds that there had been a "taking" within the meaning
of both the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitutions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that a "taking" had occurred. But it was their
opinion that the United States had "taken," as the Congress of the United
States had declared that all the air space necessary for the safe flying (the safe
minimal level to be determined by the Civil Aeronautics Authority) is within
the public domain and included in such public domain is that air space necessary for take-off and landing operations.' 4
Griggs asked for, and received, review by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' The Court held, Douglas writing the opinion with Black and Frankfurter in dissent, that:
1. A taking had occurred.'
2. Air easements are as necessary for airplane runways as are approaches to a bridge."
3. Allegheny County, the owner and operator of the air terminal
had been the "taker."' 8
A decision such as Griggs that takes into account a great technological "leap
forward" is truly a momentous one. But even here, the law, when changing
rapidly, must build from the past. It must find its analogy from the "like"
case. Constitutional law, American style, is more flexible than case or statute
8 Apparently the buildings on the Griggs' property were constructed by this time. "Their
properties were bought and their homes built before the ground was acquired for an airport."
Gardner v. Allegheny County, supra note 5, at 493. Griggs was one of the property holders in
the above case.
9 Lambert & Joost, supra note 7, at 354.
10 Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
11 Under Pennsylvania law, in cases of damage to property by governmental entities, the
petitioner requests, from the Court of Common Pleas, the appointment of a Board of Viewers
to assess the amount of the alleged damage. The Viewers opinion may be appealed to the
Court of Common Pleas where the action may be -heard de novo. Griggs v. Allegheny County,
402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123, 124 (1961).
12 Cited in Trimble, Airport Approach and Eminent Domain in PennsylvaniaAs Observed
By Viewers, 30 PA. B.A.Q. 371, 374 (1959).
13 Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
14 Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra note 11, at 125.
15 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
16 Id. at 90. Black and Frankfurter agreed with this point.
17 Ibid.
18 Black and Frankfurter felt the United States did the taking. Id. at 94.
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law in development of new doctrine to handle new and radical cases."x But
even in constitutional law there must be a foundation, although at -times it may
be a fairly shaky- foundation. The finding in the Griggs case, .that noise is a
destruction of property requiring compensation, had to be based on past decisions for its rationale. It is this short historical background that must be sketched
if an understanding and an appreciation of all the complex aspects of the Griggs
case is to be forthcoming.
The state of air law and property owners' lights is such that in almost
all jurisdictions the surface owner is probably regarded as owner of the superadjacent space to a reasonable height. Even in light of the Griggs' decision, this
is still an accurate description of the state of the law. How did we get here?
This study will now be concerned with understanding fully the forces at work
and recognizing fully the path' the law has traveled to reach this point. The
spotlight will move from the early period, pre-;1946, to: Causby,20 then to the
period between Causby and Griggs. Then on to post-Griggs. Finally, the writer
will draw some conclusions, personal and otherwise.
Early History and Problems
It was recognized early that noise was going to present a problem in future
aircraft and airport development.
The greatest bugaboo, of course, is the noise. How long the aircraft
will continue to be accompanied by such overwhelming and overpowering noise, is a matter which only the engineers and their
patron saint, St. Patrick, canf answer.'* * * While airplanes were
new and novel; the question of noise was one of slight importance.
They were entertaining. But when the novelty wears off and when
night flying with its departure and arrival of planes at all hours,
as at our union stations, has become an accomplished fact, the
householder whose home adjoins the airport is going to find that
his days are hideous and his nights are sleepless. 2'
This was written in 1929, some fourteen years before Causby's chickens were
to kill themselves by flying wildly into the side of their coops, and thirty years
before nights at the Griggs house were to become a long succession of sleepless
nightmares. Prophetic words, but at the same time there were several complicating factors that- precluded any quick resolution of the conflict between
"rights of flight" and "property rights."
One of these complications was the ancient belief that a landowner owned
all the land beneath his property to the center of the earth and all the space
above his land to the heavens. 2 "From the fires of hell to the heights of heaven."
In the original this Latin doctrine read: Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad
Coelum. There were those as late as 1930 who still considered "ad coelum"
19

Lnv, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 10 (1961).

20 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21 From a speech by George B. Logan to the American Bar Association in 1929. 54 A.B.A.
lPtz.869, 876-77 (1929).
22 Historical accounts of this doctrine may be found in: Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est
... Quousque Tandem?, 26 J. Am L. & Com. 237 (1959) and Abramovitch, The Maxim
"Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Coelum" As Applied in Aviation, 8 McGrML L.J. 247
(1962). An able discussion of the place of the doctrine in aviation law just prior to the Causby
decision is: Lashbrook, The "Ad Coelum" Maxim As Applied To Aviation Law, 21 NoaRE
DAE LAWYER 143 (1946).
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as the law in air space controversies." To believe this was good common law
in the Coke-Blackstone tradition, but the tradition placed an obstacle in the
path of the resolution of the conflict.24 The effects of this belief are seen by
noting that the "ad coelum" theory was the first argument put forth by aggrieved
landowners from the first case in 192225 until the "unification" of the law in
1946.2" The continued advancement of the theory meant that a dubious concept
was given increased validity by the very fact that the courts were time and
time again forced to reject the claim that the landowner owned the sky over
his head to the "heights of heaven."
A second entangling factor was the belief that the right to flight was as
inalienable as the right to property - a right that was not to be abrogated by
other men; a right that was to have all the solidity and validity as the right of
private property. "Nor is this freedom [of the air] the basis of a mere privilege
which a person must justify. It 27is the basis of a right of equal dignity with that
of the ownership of the land.
A third complicating factor was that, until 1946 and Causby, the landowner had to rely on trespass and nuisance as grounds for relief." Trespass
deals, of course, with the movement of aircraft through air space that is presumably owned by the landowner. 29 A nuisance would derive from actual airport operation and originate within the confines of the airport property itself.3"
The attempts to use these forms met with defeat, and for very important reasons.
The inconvenience of the nuisance to the individual landowner was usually felt
to be far outweighed by the common good, or public interest, involved in the
continued operation of the airports. Another aspect of the difficulties inherent
in the use of the nuisance complaint came from an analogy to the railroads.
The courts had not favored the landowners in suits against railroads that alleged
the creating of a nuisance, and thus there did not exist a convenient foundation
for building favorable results in a reasonably similar area. Indeed, the courts
had gone so far as to indicate that the noise, dust, disturbance from the railroads was a "legalized nuisance" and hence did not constitute a "taking."'"
If no "taking" resulted, then just compensation could not, of course, be required
to be paid.
Another factor that delayed the concept of an air easement was the belief
that such easement would either leave ". . . the right of the aviator in an
extremely nebulous state,"32 or, it was impossible of accomplishment. "Gen23 Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air, 16 IowA L. Rav. 169 (1930).
24 Hackley, Trespassers In the Sky, 21 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1937).
25 Commonwealth v. Nevin, 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (1922).
26 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Use of "ad coelum" as first argument
noted in 16 SW. L.J. 346 (1962).
27 Green, Trespass By Airplane, 31 ILL. L. REV. 499, 502 (1937). Leon Green was, at the
time of the cited article, Dean of the Northwestern University Law School. Compare this with
an earlier pronouncement by Dean Green: "There is every reason to conceive of flight as a
right, in the sense of freedom or liberty, rather than a privilege." 29 ILL. L. REv. 590 (1935).
28 Note, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 62, 63 (1947).
29 Mace, Ownership of Airspace, 17 U. CINC. L. Rav. 343, 345 (1948).
30 Ibid.
31 See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) for a discussion of this
point.
32 Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in AngloAmerican Law, 3 J. Am L. & CoM. 329, 353 (1932).
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erally it has been said that the gaining of an easement of flight through the
air space over land is not possible."3 If a thing is not "possible," then there
would appear to be little reason to consider it. Consequently, there was little
consideration of air easements during this period.
It can be seen that the early attempts by the publicists to meet the problems involved were confounded by the wide variety of opinions that were set
forth. The diversity of the writers on the subject was but a reflection of the
confusion of the courts. Massachusetts interpreted low. flights as being "technical
trespasses."" Delaware held that low flights were "unprivileged" excursions
into the superadjacent air space and as such they were trespasses. 5 The earliest
federal case on flying craft saw the court holding that the landowner owned
the air space below the minimum altitude for safe flight as had been set by
the Civil Aeronautics Board. 6 A later federal court decision used the theory
of possible effective possession." That is, how much air space could the landowner possibly hold? A state court arrived at the same solution during this
pre-Causby period." Another federal court adopted the "actual use" test of ownership. "The owner of the land owns as much of the space above him as he
uses, but only so long as he uses it."'4
Several theories of land and superadjacent air space ownership were put
forward during this period. First, of course, was the ancient doctrine that the
landowner possessed property from the center of the earth on outward to the
upper limits of the sky - the "ad coelum" doctrine. Second was the theory
that the landowner possessed the air space as long as he used the air space the "actual use" test. A third theory was that of the possible effective ownership. How much can .the landowner possibly effectually use? The fourth theory
was the concept that ownership of air space did rest with the landowner below
the minimum safe altitude levels set by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Thus in
brief compass, we have been brought forward to the Supreme Court's first
pronouncement on this problem.
United States v. Causby41
Briefly stated the facts of the case were: Causby bought 2.8 acres of land
in 1934. At that time an airstrip was located one-third of a mile distant. The
airstrip then presented no great noise problem to either the Causbys or their
means of livelihood, the raising of chickens. In April of 1942 the airstrip became
the Greensboro Municipal Airport, but the effects of the flights still were not
severe enough to cause great discomfort or annoyance to the chickens or Causby.
In May, 1942, the United States assumed control of the airport under a leasing
33 Kingsley & Mansham, The Correlative Interests of the Landowner and the Airman, 3
J. AmL. & Com. 374, 378 (1932).
34 Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 393 (1930).
35 Vanderslice v. Shawn, 2 Del. Ch. Rep. 225, 27 A.2d 87, 90 (1942).
36 Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929). Involved
here was a lighter-than-air craft.
37 Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. N.Y. 1936).
38 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942).
39 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
40 Id. at 758.
41 328 U.S. 256 (1946).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
agreement with the airport, and began the flights of huge four-engine, longrange bombing craft. This caused discomfort to the personal life of the
Causbys, and additionally, it marked a decline in egg production. Beyond this,
it was so frightening to the chickens that many of them flew wildly into the
side of their coops and literally dashed themselves to death.
The Court in holding that an air easement had been taken,42 decided
four major points. First, the Court rejected the "ad coelum" doctrine as being
without value."' The Court then affirmed the established doctrine that it is
the character of the invasion that determines whether or not there has been a
"taking."4'4 45 In other words, as long as the damage is substantial, there is a
"taking."
There can be, then, a partial "taking" in the same sense as there
can be a "temporary taking."4 "If any substantial enjoyment of the land still
remains to the owner, it may be treated as a partial instead of a total divesting
of his property in the land."4 The problem with "taking" is, of course, the
tendency to associate "taking" with the actual physical handling of property.
"The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to our
conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely
clothed. ' '4 8 What is involved here is a "mental taking."49 "You take my life
when you take the means whereby I live." 5
The Court has long held that there need not be an actual physical invasion
for a taking. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay 1 the Court noted that it would be
to "pervert" the Constitutional intent if "taking" did not also mean destruction
of the usefulness of property. 2 Again:
It is conceivable that the first [property right] was used in its
vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to
which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other
hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to
denote the group of rights inherring in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In
point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter.5 3
The general rule is that there need not be an actual physical "taking,"
but a restriction in the use of value of the land with an attendant conferring
54
of the property rights upon the public does constitute a "taking."
The third point in the Causby decision was reached by analogy. The
Court cited and relied greatly upon Portsmouth Land & Hotel Co..v. United
States.5 There it was held that a "taking" had occurred due to repeated
firings of cannon shots over a resort hotel. A "...
continuance of them [the
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 266.
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 266.
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924).
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328-29 (1917).
Mr. Justice Holmes in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155, (1921).
See, Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41
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L.J. 221 (1932).

51 80 U.S. 166 (1872).
52 Id. at 177-78.
53 United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
54 60 MICH. L. REV. 98, 99 (1961). See, United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co.,
112 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1884) and United States v. Lynah 188 U.S. 445, 470, 474 (1903).
55 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
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cannon shots] in sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove it [the
'taking']. Every successive trespass adds to the force of the evidence."5 Thus,
even though the Court did not specifically hold that repeated flights would
be necessary, the implication is quite clear.
The fourth major aspect of the decision saw the Court .setting up a zonal

concept of air space.57 The lower zone is owned by the landowner, and the

upper zone is in the public domain. The lower zone is, at least, that part of
the air space that is necessary for the landowner's enjoyment and use of his
land. It was clear that this zone was violated in Causby's instance.
The Causby decision marked the great breakthrough. "Ad coelum" is
rejected and a more equitable concept is applied to the continually increasing
problem of airports and landowners.
Causby to Griggs
The period from the decision in Causby (1946) to the decision in Griggs
(1962) was a period that saw many decisions 'handed down dealing with the
question of air space ownership, or landowner v. aviator. It is to this Causbyto-Griggs period that we now turn for an examination.'
Comments on the quality of the Causby decisions ranged from those who
saw it as "unifying" air-law 9 and those who saw the court as taking a "devious"
path, to those who wrote that it creates "substantial confusion." 61
If opinions were varied as to the merits of the decision, and they were,
then we could reasonably expect that the proferred solutions would have also
varied greatly in content, and they did. One 'called for an "education" of the
public apparently to accept a new, higher, noise level or to count their blessings
when their eardrums were assaulted.62 Another suggested that chickens would
adjust to noisy flights in much the same fashion as cows and other domestic
animals had adjusted to automobiles, trains, and other technological advances.6
Others advanced substantive or procedural changes that would forestall
future difficulties of this type. "....

[L]itigation of this type [Causby] may be

avoided in the future by use of remedies available to municipalities as agents
56 Id. at 329-30.
57 328 U.S. at 263-64. See, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 110 (1947).
58 The Causby case brought forth a veritable flood of articles, notes, and shorter comments.
Most of this material is mentioned below. For comments on the Court of Claims phase of the
controversy, see, 45 COLUMN. L. REv. 121 (1946) and 58 HARv.L. Rev. 1252 (1945). On the
Supreme Court decision, see: Nagel, The Causby Case and the Relation of Landowners and
Aviators - A New Theory For the Protection of the Landowner, 14 J. Am L. & Com. 112
(1947); Mace, Ownership of Space, 17 U. CINo. L. REv. 343 (1948); Precker, Airports As
Nuisances, 71 N.J.L.J. 289 (1948); Thorpe, Flight of Aircraft As A Taking of Property, 1
Wyo. L.J. 148 (1947); Wolf, Property: Landowner's Right To Air Space, 30 MARQ. L. lEv.

193 (1947); Notes and Comments, 25 N.C.L. REv. 64 (1946); Note, 21 TEmP. L.Q. 62
(1947); Comment, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 224 (1946); 35 CALIF. L. Rev. 110 (1947); 25 TExAs

L.RFv. 91 (1946); 20 TEMP. L.Q. 156 (1946); 22 NOTRE DAME LAWYZER 228 (1947); 12
Mo.L.Rev. 70 (1947); 32 VA.L.Rev. 1191 (1946); 31 MINN. L.Rev. 384 (1947); 21 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rev. 92 (1946); 26 NEB. L. REv. 123 (1946).
59 Anderson, Some Aspects of Air Trespass, 27 J. Am L. & Com. 341 (1960).
60 35 CALIF. L.REv. 110, 115 (1947).
61 Note, 74 HAxv. L. Rev. 1581, 1584 (1961).
62

Fraleigh & Goddard, Airport Planning and Management, 23

3.

Am L. & Com. 156, 161

(1956).
63 Thorpe, Flight of Aircraft As A Taking of Property, 1 Wyo. LJ. 148, 151 (1947).
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of the states operating the airports for a public purpose." 6 The principal remedy
seen in this case was prior purchase of the air space.65 Another saw that "aviation easements offer a solution to the problem and in many cases should be
obtained... -2'66 preferably in advance, it might be added. A more optimistic
note was struck by a writer who saw the solution in the "progress" of building
improved airports and airplanes. This progress ". . . will virtually eliminate
such causes of action as dust, noise, brilliant illumination and congregation
of crows, leaving only the menace of low flying as a complaint."6 7
During this period, two independent complicating factors arose. The first
was the arrival of the jet with its increased noise factor. In addition to the
increase in noise, the larger planes needed more room in which to turn and
they needed a longer, shallower glide path at take-offs and in landings." Indeed,
the increased noise factor of the jets approached the threshold of causing
serious physical damage to an average individual's ear. 9 The second complication came with the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.70 In the
Causby case, the Court's decision was made easier by the fact that in legally
defined terms airport glide paths were below the minimal "safe altitude" as set
by the Civil Aeronautics Board.7' The new legislation specifically included
the glide paths within the national control as "safe altitudes."7 2 Because the
new law can be affirmatively placed in time, the scrutiny of court decisions in
the post-Causby but pre-Griggs period can be divided into two periods: pre1958 and post-1958.
There were two state court decisions that appear to have the greatest
significance in the first sub-period. The California courts held that an air
easement could exist for one type of plane and for a certain altitude." In
other words, the court would logically be able to separate the quieter propeller
craft from the noisier jet aircraft. The other significant state decision was the
immediate forerunner to the Griggs case: Gardnerv. Allegheny County."' Here
the court held that injunctive relief could not be granted. 5 The thing to note
in Gardner is that the property owners were still attempting at this date to
gain injunctive relief.
The federal courts also contributed to the further re-defining of air law
during this period. It was held that failure to sell property was not conclusive
proof that aircraft noise would interfere with any other use that the landowner
might be able to make of his property."' In other words, damages could not
be levied on anticipated profits.
Note, 25 N.C.L. REv. 64, 70 (1946).
Ibid.
German, The Conflicting Interests of Airport Owners and Nearby Property Owners, 20
U. KAN. CITY L.R xv. 138, 152 (1951).
67 Precker, Airports As Nuisances, 71 N.J.L.J. 289, 299 (1948).
68 Fraleigh & Goddard, supra note 62, at 159.
69 Anderson, supra note 59, at 348.
64
65
66

70 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958).
71 328 U.S. 256, 264-66.
72 72 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1958).
73 O'Banion v. Borba, 32 Cal.2d 145, 195 P.2d 10 (1948).
74 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
75 Id. at 504.
76 Homestead Warehouse Corp. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 572 (Ct. C1. 1951).
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Also, cemetery land became difficult to "take." Construction of an airport adjacent to an established cemetery did not mean a diminution of that
land's value as a burial place. 7 This period also witnessed an attempt to gain
injunctive relief in federal court.' The attempt, as might have been anticipated;
was a failure. The court did go on to say, however, that their decision did not
preclude the possibility that a "taking" might occur in the future and if it did
occur, then compensation would be necessary."9 It was also held that a prescriptive easement could be enlarged from the original, and compensation would
then be due on the enlargement.80 In the same case it was -held that the first
overflight, plus the intent to continue, constituted the beginning of the taking.81
A federal court also held that lateral interference was not covered by Causby."2
Another federal court also decided that navigable air space means that a
privilege to travel in and out of air space does exist, and, this privilege does
not necessarily mean public ownership of the airspace." However, the surface
owner has a claim to the air space at any altitude from which interference
emanates.8 4 This was the general state of the law prior to the then-new Congressional enactment.
One of the first decisions rendered after passage of the new legislation
saw a court interpret the enactment to mean that Congress had intended to
pre-empt the legislative field in this area."8 Thus, a municipality could not
proceed against airlines in an attempt to abate the noise problem, as Congress
desired uniformity of law. The courts also re-affirmed earlier decisions by
holding that "taking" could only occur where the flights were directly over the
landowner's property." Lateral interference was not covered by the Causby
principle. Also, the violation of an air easement over vacant land was not
compensable.8
In other words, the courts were not ready to award damages
on the basis of what the owner of a vacant strip of land said he might do with
the land. Another series of opinions also tended to tie down when "taking"
actually began.' All agreed that the "taking" occurred with the first flight;
however, two opinions held that intent to continue was also important in the
determination. 9
This brings the survey down to the Griggs decision.
Griggs v. Allegheny County"
This portion of the study will deal primarily with some questions raised
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
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by other commentators about the Griggs decision. The factual situation has
been canvassed earlier and does not need further elaboration at this point.91
One writer has raised a question of prime importance with respect to the
Griggs case. "The opinions and the form of the order in Griggs do not indicate
the basis for Supreme Court jurisdiction."92 He partially answered his own
question by noting that through the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment "just compensation" clause might be protected against state encroachment.
"Presumably that part of the Fifth Amendment that requires 'just compensa9 3
tion' has been read into the Fourteenth Amendment and controls the states.
(Emphasis added.) Compare "presumably" with: 9"
In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized
by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under
its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured
to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due
process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment
by the highest court of the State is a denial of a right secured to
the owner by that instrument.
Or compare "presumably" with:"
We may examine proceedings in state courts for appropriation
of private property to public purposes so far as to inquire whether
a rule of law was adopted in absolute disregard of the owner's right
to just compensation. If the necessary result was to deprive him
of property without such compensation, then due process of law
was denied him, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
It would appear that the law would be fairly well settled. The Supeme Court
has jurisdiction, through the fourteenth amendment, when compensation is
not made in property "taking" instances. This has not always been the law
but has been, presumably, since 1897.96
The same writer also questions when the claim "became actionable."'"
That is, when did the taking occur? The silence of the Court on this matter
can be fairly construed to mean that they acquiesce in the mounting body of
opinion that holds "taking" to occur with the first flight over the property.98
Another writer raises the question of why the suit was not grounded in a
nuisance action.99 To bring suit in a nuisance proceeding would have involved
injunctive relief. Injunctive relief would have probably been denied on the
grounds that Congress had defined the navigable air space to include the space
91 Supra at notes 2-4, p. 289-90.
92 Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County In Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
ExpropriationLaw, in SUPRBME COURT REVIEW 1962 63, 84 (Kurland ed. 1962).
93 Id. at 85.
94 Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
95 McCoy v. Union Elevated Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 363 (1918).
96 Prior to 1897 the Court had ruled: "If private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it must be remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment was
adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with
the one we are construing, was left out, and this [the due process clause] was taken." Davidson
v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878). See, ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
70-72 (1955).
97 Dunham, supra note 92, at 86.
98 Supra note 88 and cases cited therein.
99 Note, 42 B.U.L. Rv. 565, 570-71 (1962).
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Additionally, as was pointed out earlier,
needed for landing and' taking off.'
the raising of the nuisance issue could easily result in a declaration of "legalized
nuisance" and thus no compensation could be awarded. Though damages
would have been higher in a nuisance judgment,"0 ' the risks of gaining no
damages were out of proportion, to the risks involved in the path that was
followed in the search for "justice."
A far more difficult question has been raised. Why was Allegheny County
held responsible for the "taking"? In the light of the Congressional definition
of air space, it would appear that the United States did the taking. What makes
this question difficult of resolution is that Justices Black and Frankfurter agreed
with the rest of the Court, that a taking occurred; but they reasoned that
the taking had been by the United States. They did not accept the logic of
Justice Douglas who said "...
that respondent, which was the promoter,
owner, and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the one who took
the air easement in the constitutional sense."' 0 2 Douglas said that there was
"... no difference between its responsibility for the air easements necessary for
the operation of the airport and its responsibility for the land on which the
runways were built."'0 3 He pointed out that "the glide path for the northeast
runway [over the Griggs' property] is as necessary for the operation of the
airport as is a surface right of way for operation of a bridge, or as is the land
for the operation of a dam."' 0 He approvingly noted language from a state
court: "An adequate approach way is as necessary a part of an airport as is
the ground on which the airstrip is constructed.' 0 5
The Black-Frankfurter argument was simply that Congress had adopted
a national plan regulating air space, and in that plan Congress had appropriated
the air space. Thus, if Congress had appropriated, there is no need for Allegheny County to appropriate.
In answer to this argument, the agreement between the United States and
the County is fairly difficult to explain away, and it gives the, impression that
all responsibilities for "easements or other interests in land or air space" are
with the County. The pertinent points of the agreement between the United
States and the County are as follows: 0 6
(i) insofar as is within its power and reasonably possible, the
sponsor will prevent the use of any land either within or outside
the boundaries of the Airport in any manner (including the construction, erection, alteration, or growth of any structure or other
object thereon) which would create a hazard to the landing, takeoff or maneuvering of aircraft at the Airport, or otherwise limit the
usefulness of the Airport. This objective will be accomplished either
100 Butler, The Landowner v. The Airport: Property Rights in Airspace In Light of Griggs
v. Allegheny County, 24 U. PrrT. L. Rav. 603, 615 (1963). See, City of Newark v. Eastern
Airlines, supra note 85, where it was held that Congressional intent was uniformity and thus injunctive relief was not granted.
101 Note, 42 B.U.L. REv. 565, 570-71 (1962).
102 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962).
103 Id. at 89.
104 Id. at 90.
105 Ibid., quoted from Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664, 671
(1960).
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by the adoption and enforcement of a Zoning Ordinance and regulations, or by the acquisition of easements or other interests in land
or airspace, or by both such methods.
A more oblique attack on the Black-Frankfurter position was launched by
Douglas in a footnote."' Douglas noted that "[i]n circumstances more opaque
than this we have held lessors to their Constitutional obligations,"1 8 citing the
09
case of Burton v. Wilmington Parkway Authority."
In that case the Court held that a lessor had to desegregate his cafe on the
grounds that he had leased the space from the Wilmington Parking Authority,
a governmental entity. The cafe was in a building that was occupied in part
by the public parking facility, though within the walls there was not an entrance
into the cafe from the parking area. Here, then, a lessor more removed from
the immediate scene and having less responsibility for the over-all operation,
was held as having to fulfill his Constitutional obligations, or at least those
obligations as seen by the majority of the Court. If under these circumstances
a private individual must meet Constitutional requirements, then, certainly,
a governmental unit should be expected to follow the same general rule.
It has also been queried: "What constitutes the taking of an air easement; can Congress or the states void the taking . . . ?""0 There have been

other points raised elsewhere that can be employed in answer to the question
of "voiding." It has been noted that in the airplane decisions "corrective justice," or, ". .. the righting of wrongs already accomplished,"" has been the
goal. Another publicist, writing after Causby, noted: "The decision appears
. . . to take out of the legislative realm the problem of fixing property rights

in the air and to preserve this prerogative to the courts.""' 2 In effect, that is
what was done in the Griggs case. If this is the attitude of the Court, and
apparently it is, then corrective justice is all that can be applied and a taking
could not be voided. It is doubtful, under any circumstances, whether or not
a voiding of a court-declared "taking" could be accomplished by legislative
enactment. A ".... strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.""' 3
Before leaving the Griggs decision, an examination of a strikingly "like"
case" would appear to be in order. There have been many critics of the Court's
reasoning in the two landmark cases of Causby and Griggs."' Some of these
critics have left the general impression that the Court indulged in the construction of Constitutional principle out of straws, paying too little regard to
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the historical basis of their decision." 6 One critic has written that the Court
devised a doctrine after determining what "equitable justice" demanded." 7
In other words, there was no basis in law or history, for. their decision. While
the dispensation of "equitable justice" is not to be deplored, neither is it
sufficient answer in itself for understanding, or explaining, the decision reached
in Griggs. The Court does not, and cannot, exist or work in a vacuum. A
large part of the Court's frame of reference, regardless of other pressures, is
in the law and legal principles. Part of the larger frame of reference is a
smaller one which involves similarities in "like" cases.
Richards v. Washington Terminal Company" supplies a most similar
case to the Griggs case in substance, issue, and holding. The Washington Terminal Company, like Allegheny County, was to acquire "the lands and property
necessary for all and every the purposes contemplated .. . .""
The "purposes contemplated" were ihe construction, operation, and maintenance of
a railroad terminal. A railroad terminal is a transportation center, much the
same as an airport terminal, which is used by common carriers not directly involved in the building or operation of the facilities. To assist in the successful
operation of the terminal, the Court noted that ".... Congress has authorized,
and in effect commanded, defendant to construct . . . a tunnel with a portal
located in the midst of an inhabited portion of the city."'"0 The Court recognized that the single portal of the tunnel was spewing forth smoke and ash
on Richards' property and thereby rendering the property useless. Congress
commanded, the Terminal Company obeyed and the landowner lost the usefulness of his property. Congress ordained, Allegheny County obeyed and the
landowner lost the usefulness of his property. The Court held that the
property, in the Richards case, had been taken and the "taking" had been
accomplished by the Terminal Company - in spite of the Congressional edict.
"If the damage is not preventable by the employment at reasonable expense
of devices such as have been suggested, then plaintiff's property is 'necessary
for the purposes contemplated,' and may be acquired by purchase or condemnation . . . and pending its acquisition defendant is responsible."'"' It
is difficult to determine any substantial difference in the basic outline of this
decision and the Griggs case. It is difficult, therefore, to accept the implication
that would seem to indicate that the Court was working in the dark when it
handled the problem presented in the Causby and Griggs cases.
However, one problem that is still unsolved does remain. That difficulty
is best seen in light of the slight developments since Griggs.
Post-Griggs
The remaining question will be examined in its reflection as revealed
in two court decisions. In a federal case, the court reaffirmed an earlier
116 E.g., Hays, United States v. Causby: An Extension Thereof, 36 W. & M. L. REv. 36
(1961); Nagel, The Causby Case and the Relation of Landowners and Aviators - A New
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117 Hays, supra note 116, at 60.
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principle by holding that a "taking" can only occur when flights are directly
over the property of the landowner. 2 The second court decision, in a state
court, marks a movement away from the general principle requiring direct
overflight of property for "taking." "[I]nterference with the use and enjoyment of one's land can also be a taking even though the noise vector may
come from some direction other than the perpendicular."'" 3 Thus, despite the
"genius" of the courts in fitting old law to new circumstances, a singularly
large, and difficult, problem area remains. The solution to the issue might
be aided by another matter, or multi-matter, that, in a manner of speaking,
was created by the Griggs case.
Aggrieved landowners, apparently triggered by the successful litigation
of Thomas P. Griggs, have swung into action against the nation's airports.
One newspaper has counted one hundred and sixty suits involving airplane
noise that have been actually filed and has estimated that two hundred and
fifty more suits are pending. Twenty-eight million dollars is being asked for
in the way of damages. 4 From the diversity that is surely represented in the
accumulated number of lawsuits there will, beyond a doubt, emerge a unity in
the future treatment of "noise." Thus, the second "problem" will aid the
successful resolution of the first.
Conclusions
From its prosaic beginnings with an overhanging pear tree2 5 air law has
evolved into a rather comprehensive and complete set of rules. The development has been rapid, and it has been necessarily so. At one time a letter from
the Postmaster General of the United States was sufficient to move aircraft
flights from their low passage over a chicken farm to a higher altitude that
was more amenable to egg production. 6 The modem era has required a
different method of concluding the same problem. If common law practice is
the pouring of new content into old concepts,2 7 then the development of air
law, or at least that portion of air law under discussion, is an outstanding
example of the common law at work. The job, of course, is not completed.
There remains, for instance, the large question of the property owner who,
in wing-tip to wing-tip measurement, falls outside the glide path of aircraft.
His property is not overflown. But the damage to his property, as expressed in
terms of usefulness, is real. Should he be denied legal recourse because the
law has become rigidified? "It is sterile formality to say the government takes
an easement in private property when it repeatedly sends aircraft directly
over the land at altitudes so low as to render the land unusable by its owner,
but does not take an easement when it sends aircraft a few feet to the right
or left of the perpendicular boundaries (thereby rendering the same land
122 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
123 Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (Ore.) (1962).
124 Pittsburgh Press, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 23, col. 3, cited in Bruce, The Landowner v. The
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equally unusable). " The Air Force calls the noise the "sound of Freedom." 2 The airline industry, including airport management, calls it the
"price of progress."'3 0 Those who live near and around airports, both military and commercial, call it "sheer hell."'31 If the noise is to be likened to the
infernal regions, then surely the torment is the same for the property owner
who lives next door to the glide path as it is for the landowner directly under
the glide path.
The ultimate solution to the noise problem will arrive when science
delivers us into the age of noiseless flight. Until scientific knowledge advances
the permanent solution, the temporary solution must be sought within legal
terms. Legal terms that must be defined on a national basis. Schemes or solutions that involve local regulations are shortsighted in nature " 2 "A way of
travel which quickly escapes the bound of local regulative competence called
for a more penetrating, uniform and exclusive regulation by the nation than
had been thought appropriate for the more easily controlled commerce of the
past. " '" To put it simply, the airplane transcends federalism.
Additionally, the solution will have to be sought through the courts,' 3 '
moving in ad hoc fashion, and basing their determinations on reasonableness and interest-balancing.
In other words, in much the same fashion as
has been pursued to this point. "Reasonableness is so inherent in the judicial
balancing of interests in the airport cases that most of the decisions... simply
proceed to investigate the facts and then grant or deny relief upon the basis
of the reasonableness of one interest yielding to another in a given case."' 30
This is operating within the common law tradition. To use the traditional
methods of the common law necessarily means that the law will "lag" behind
scientific and technological achievements. The "lag" is neither to be deplored
nor to be condemned, 3 7 but it is to be understood as part of the total development of a nation. The forward thrust of a nation involves far more than scientific and technological advance. And law, as the embodiment of "the story
of a nation's development"' 38 must take into account more than scientific and
technical knowledge. Law must express the human experience that is involved
in the forward movement.
The willingness to rely on the courts for solution of the air space problem
is also based on a generalization that emerges from this study of conflicts be128
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tween science and the individual. The continued growth of air law has been
characterized by the willingness of the judiciary to use their talents in the
search for solution. The decisions truly appear ". . . to take out of the legislative realm the problem of fixing property rights in the air and to preserve
'
this prerogative to the courts."139
The Supreme Court has turned to the Constitution in an effort to give some degree of justice and protection to the landholder who finds his holdings facing extinction at the hands of rapid transportation. ". . . [T]he holding in Griggs is clearly that a landowner's constitutional right to just compensation for a taking of his property can not be
avoided by a- Congressional declaration as to the limits of navigable airspace." 14 From the Court that is both the "protector" and "guarantor" of
the Constitution, nothing less could be expected.
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